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At the G8 Deauville Summit in 2011, the decision was taken to extend the G8 Global 
Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP) 
beyond the initially envisioned period of ten years, projected to end in 2012. This 
paper explores the evolution of the GP and examines the question of how the renewed 
Partnership might be reconfigured in terms of composition, structuring, areas of 
operation and priorities to take threat reduction work ahead in the post-2012 period. 
Drawing also from material published by the G8 and taking into account 
pronouncements by key officials, this paper overall argues that flexibility and 
inclusivity will be the defining features of the renewed GP that can be expected to fit 
into many dresses in terms of programming, membership, and the area of operation. 
Moreover, the assertion is made that the renewed Partnership could be a hybrid, on 
the one side, bringing in and building on the experiences, lessons-learned, expertise, 
networks, and principles of the old-GP, and, at the same time, extended and 
supplemented with elements drawn from the nuclear security summit (NSS) series 
anticipated to conclude in 2014. 
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Introduction 
The G81 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass 
Destruction (GP) was launched shortly after the attacks of September 11, 2001, in an 
effort “to prevent terrorists, or those that harbour them, from acquiring or developing 
nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, 
equipment and technology” (G8 2002). Given the necessities and priorities of the time, 
related projects and associated funds provided by the Partners were to be focused on 
Russia. So, in line with the principles agreed upon at Kananaskis (Canada) in June 2002, 
$ 20 billion in funds were to be committed in equal shares by the US and the remaining 
G8 states for a period of 10 years – earning the initiative also the label “10 plus 10 over 
10”. A large portion of this amount was to be used for destroying the remaining 
chemical weapons stocks of Russia, dismantling its decommissioned submarines, and 
engaging former weapons scientists.  
 
However, despite the prioritization of projects in Russia, at the very outset, the 
decision was taken to gradually expand the GP’s membership and geographical focus. 
The statement issued by the G8 at Kananaskis thus included an invitation to other 
countries that supported the same goals and were prepared to adopt the principles 
and guidelines agreed upon to pursue dialogue with the G8 on joining the Partnership. 
As of December 2012, membership in the GP had grown to 25 states and was likely to 
grow further given the Partnership’s “open-door policy” and the decision taken at the 
Deauville Summit (France) in 2010 to extend the Partnership beyond the period of 10 
years envisioned initially.  
 
Against this background, this paper sets out to summarize the evolution of the GP, 
explore its main objectives and achievements in broader terms and discuss how the 
renewed Partnership might be reconfigured in terms of composition, structuring, areas                                                         
1 The G8 comprises the US, Canada, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, UK, and Russia. The EU has also been 
participating in G8 (formerly G7) meetings since 1977. Except for the fact that only the participating 
countries are entitled to assume the rotating presidency, the Union enjoys the same rights and 
obligations associated with membership.    
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of operation and priorities to take the threat reduction work ahead in the post-2012 
period.   
 
GP’s Birth, Principles, Guidelines and Functioning 
By the time the GP was launched, the threat posed by inadequately secured CBRN 
material had not gone unnoticed and efforts to cope with such threats were already in 
place. The US in particular had been undertaking serious efforts and spending 
immense amounts of money from the early 1990s onwards to mitigate the challenges 
posed by the nuclear legacy of the Soviet Union. The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat 
Reduction Program which was launched as early as 1992 and has ever since addressed 
issues such as weapons dismantlement, nuclear material security and nuclear scientist 
engagement, constitutes a prominent case in point.2 Moreover, a first summit on 
nuclear safety and security was held between the then G7 and Russia in Moscow in 
1996 (Hibbs 1996). What is more, by that time, nuclear safety and security related 
projects on the territory of the former Soviet Union (FSU) were also being 
implemented by other actors such as the EU through its TACIS (Technical Aid to the 
Commonwealth of Independent States) Program that focused mainly on nuclear safety 
but also tackled nuclear material accountancy, illicit trafficking and scientist redirection 
(see Heyes/Bowen/Chalmers 2011, 18). Nevertheless, the bulk of the job was being 
done by the US that was thus carrying the lion’s share of the financial burden. As a 
budget of $ 400 million annually in the initial phase had grown to around $ 1 billion 
over the years, there was an increasing demand on the part of the US, especially the 
US Congress, for a more balanced cost sharing with other wealthy countries (cf. Ibid., 
17).3 At the same time, the events of 09/11 pushed international terrorism, including                                                         
2 As of May 2012, among others, 7,619 nuclear warheads had been deactivated, 902 intercontinental 
ballistic missiles (ICBM) destroyed, and 155 bombers eliminated (Lugar 2012). Moreover, 24 nuclear 
weapons storage sites had received physical security upgrades (ibid.). In addition, by December 2011, 
400 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) had been downblended (Benedict 2011). 
3 The relevance of a “fairer” cost sharing was exemplified by the remarks of the then US Assistant 
Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, John Wolf, made during an interview with Leonard Spector on 
August 28, 2002 (CNS 2002): “We think that the programs we fund in Russia and the former Soviet 
Union are in our interest and there are good reasons why we fund those programs. But neither Russia 
nor our partners should ever be in a position of assuming that we will do all of these things irrespective 
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potential nuclear and radiological terrorism, to the forefront of international attention. 
The event created a sense of urgency and gave a momentum to efforts to keep CBRN 
material, know-how, and technology out of the hands of non-state actors such as 
terrorists.  
 
Ultimately, the issue of a greater contribution by the non-US G8 members to nuclear 
non-proliferation and counter-terrorism alongside a sustained US financial 
commitment was tackled at the G8 Summit in Kananaskis in June 2002 leading to the 
launch of the GP – with the US and Canada acting as the driving forces behind the 
initiative (Heyes/Bowen/Chalmers 2011, 22-23). The agreed formula of the US, on the 
one side, and the remaining G8 states, on the other side, committing $ 10 billion each 
to projects related to non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism, and nuclear 
security over a period of ten years constituted a mixed result. Given the existing levels 
of US funding and the guidelines adopted according to which not only new, but also 
“enhanced” or “expanded” projects would be listed as GP contributions and “[a]ll 
funds disbursed or released after its [GP’s] announcement” (G8 2002) would be 
eligible as related expenditures, the agreement did not necessitate a significant rise (if 
at all) in funding commitments on the part of the US (see Chuen/Jasinski/Meyer 2002). 
At the same time, the GP guaranteed sustainability and provided reassurance that US 
engagement and funding would continue for another ten years. Moreover, in the case 
of the other G8 states, the agreed framework entailed the necessity to extend 
involvement in threat reduction work and significantly increase related funding.4    
 
The statement announcing the launch of the GP also listed a set of principles to be 
followed to achieve the goals formulated. It also outlined a number of guidelines for 
project programming and implementation. The principles, overall, reflect a 
commitment to the adoption and promotion of existing non-proliferation and nuclear                                                                                                                                                                   
of their commitments, including Russia's commitments. And I'm not talking simply about cooperation on 
the Guidelines issue, but also their own financial contribution, because, if you look at it, the Russia of 
2002 is financially quite different than the Russia of 1998. They have 50-something billion dollars in the 
bank.“ 
4 So-called debt for program exchanges were installed as an optional financing tool.    
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security measures and instruments – including relevant treaties, measures to 
guarantee material accountancy, physical security, and effective border and export 
controls. In addition, the Partners are called upon to dispose “fissile materials 
designated as no longer required for defence purposes, eliminate all chemical 
weapons, and minimize holdings of dangerous biological pathogens and toxins, based 
on the recognition that the threat of terrorist acquisition is reduced as the overall 
quantity of such items is reduced” (G8 2002). In line with the established guidelines, 
projects can be of a bi- or multilateral nature and should be designed and 
implemented in a manner guaranteeing “effective monitoring, auditing and 
transparency” (ibid.) and granting liability protection as well as exemption from taxes, 
duties and alike to the donors. The formulation of clear milestones to measure 
progress, the protection of intellectual property rights, sensitive information as well as 
of equipment, the grant of privileges and immunities to the representatives of 
government donors and the consideration of environmental aspects constitute further 
criteria to be applied in project programming and implementation.  
 
In 2002, the Partners also agreed to set in place necessary mechanisms to annually 
review progress giving consideration to issues such as priority-setting, the 
identification of potential project gaps and overlaps, and “the consistency of the 
cooperation projects with international security obligations and objectives”.5 This gave 
birth to the GP Senior Officials Group (GPSOG) established “to review progress of the 
initiative and to co-ordinate projects” (G8 Senior Officials Group 2003).6 However, by 
the time of the Sea Island Summit in 2004, a two-track structure had emerged. 
Beginning with January 2004, a new Senior Group had started work on a broader range 
of non-proliferation issues including the provision of guidance to a Global Partnership 
Working Group (GPWG) that would be “responsible for expert-level implementation of                                                         
5 As mentioned above, the destruction of chemical weapons, the dismantling of decommissioned 
nuclear submarines, the disposition of nuclear materials and the redirection and engagement of former 
weapons scientists were at that time identified as priority areas to be pursued in Russia.  
6 In Kananaskis, the G8 also decided to form the G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group (NSSG) by the 
time of the following summit. The NNSG “responsible to Leaders, provides technically informed strategic 
policy advice on issues that could impact safety and security in the peaceful use of nuclear energy” (G8 
2008).  
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the initiative” (G8 Senior Group 2004; see also Kobjakov/Orlov 2005, 18). As a result, 
the GPWG established itself as the core instrument that reviews progress, coordinates 
work (including efforts to engage new donors and recipients) and helps to solve 
emerging problems; or to put it in the words of Heyes and Bowen (2010, 18), the 
GPWG acts as “the international policy group that oversees the partnership”. It brings 
together senior diplomats from the GP countries four to five times a year. The 
representative of the country holding the G8 presidency at that point also chairs 
GPWG meetings. Overall, the approach of the G8 has been to limit the creation of new 
bodies and to utilize existing structures and channels (see for example G8 Senior 
Group 2004). Where necessary, sub-working groups have been formed. The Biological 
Security Sub-Working Group whose meetings are being attended by the members of 
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit and the 
representatives of international institutions such as Interpol, WHO, or the Food and 
Agriculture Organization constitutes a case in point (Stanley Foundation 2012).  
 
The Expansion and Accomplishments of the Partnership 
A year after its launch, six new countries were to join the GP as donors, namely 
Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland (G8 Senior Group 
2004). In 2004, Australia, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, the Republic 
of Korea, and New Zealand also acceded to the GP (ibid.). The inclusion of new 
partners was, as already mentioned, anticipated at Kananaskis and constituted also a 
necessity to meet the pledge of raising € 10 billion in non-US contributions. However, 
in comparison to the amounts pledged by some G8 countries such as Germany (up to € 
1.5 billion) or Italy (€ 1 billion),7 the aggregate financial commitment of the countries 
that joined the GP in 2003 of approximately $ 200 million appeared as comparatively 
modest, yet still relevant.8 The so-called method of piggy-backing enabled the smaller                                                         
7 Following amounts had been pledged by the Partners by the time the G8 Evian Summit was held in 
2003 (G8 Senior Officials Group 2003): US, $ 10 billion; Germany, € 1.5 billion; UK, $ 750 million; France, 
€ 750 million; Japan, $ 200 million; Italy, € 1 billion; Canada, Can $ 1 billion;  the EU, € 1 billion; Russia, $ 
2 billion.  
8 According to Heyes, Bowen and Chalmers (2011, 22), non-G8 countries had spent $ 375 million by 
2010. The Nuclear Threat Initiative also provided funds to GP projects.  
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countries to channel their contributions through projects managed by greater donors 
rather than working out separate agreements with Russia. For example, the Czech 
Republic provided around $ 150,000 for the purchase of equipment needed for the 
provision of energy supply to a chemical weapons destruction facility then under 
construction in Shchuchye (cf. Kobyakov/Orlov 2005, 3). In a similar fashion, in April 
2010, it was announced that New Zealand would contribute to a Canadian-led project 
aimed at improving nuclear material security at a number of Russian sites (cf. Office of 
the Prime Minister 2010).  
 
On the part of the recipient countries, Ukraine was to join the GP in 2004. The number 
of members grew to 24 in early 2012 with Kazakhstan’s admission as another state 
eligible for GP funds. Most recently, as the first Latin American country to do so, 
Mexico acceded to the GP in December 2012.9 Overall, despite statements proclaiming 
a global role for the GP, FSU territory, and more than any other country, Russia, 
formed the main area of operation for the initiative. Nonetheless, at Hokkaido Toyako 
(Japan), in 2008, the principle was endorsed that projects should be implemented all 
over the globe in order to cope with threats wherever they emerged (cf. G8 2008). At 
the same time, it was highlighted that the Partners remained committed to completing 
projects in Russia. In line with this, the 2010 report on the GP held that Partners such 
as Canada, the US, the EU, Finland or Japan were all implementing projects in regions 
including Central Asia, Africa or the Middle East (G8 2010). “These projects reflect[ed] 
the resolve of partners to address evolving WMD challenges through the Global 
Partnership while continuing work toward completion of priority projects in Russia and 
Ukraine”, the report went on. The annex listed, for example, projects on biosecurity 
and biosafety financed by Canada in the Kyrgyz Republic, “training and reorientation in                                                         
9 The related press release of the Mexican Foreign Ministry holds that “Mexico's participation in the 
group will improve Mexico’s technical cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
in nuclear security and the physical protection of nuclear materials, and will contribute to strengthening 
the regime established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, the Convention on the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (CWC), and the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons (BWC). It will also contribute to fulfilling the commitments made by 
Mexico during the Nuclear Security Summit” (SRE n. d.). So, it is not obvious whether and to what extent 
the country will be contributing to threat reduction work abroad.  
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the field of bio-chem [sic!] technology” offered to Iraqi scientists funded by Italy, 
workshops on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) financed by Japan in 
countries such as Iraq, Cambodia, or the Philippines, or the installation of biosecurity 
equipment in a laboratory in Afghanistan and the provision of related training by 
Japan. In addition, it was outlined that the US had spent around $ 1.7 billion on 
projects in non-FSU countries including Iraq, Libya, Kenya, Indonesia and Malaysia 
between 2002 and 2009 (G8 Global Partnership Working Group 2010).  
 
By 2012, $ 21 billion had been spent on GP projects (US Department of State 2012). 
While it is obvious that the original aggregate pledge of $ 20 billion has been met, not 
all participating countries have lived up to their commitments; Italy10 and France 
constituting cases in point (Stanley Foundation 2012; Heyes/Bowen/Chalmers 2011, 
31). Russia, in contrast, had originally pledged an amount of $ 2 billion. Yet, according 
to the consolidated data available in the annex to the 2010 report, Russia was to spend 
$ 5 billion in the period 2002-2012 on chemical weapons destruction alone (G8 Global 
Partnership Working Group 2010). Another $ 618 million were spent on nuclear 
submarine dismantlement. Apart from comparatively smaller contributions by 
newcomers, this additional funding provided by Russia can be assumed to have 
allowed for a positive balance.  
 
Given the financial contributions mentioned before, it seems to be warranted to briefly 
summarize the main accomplishments of the first ten years. As stated at the outset, 
the dismantlement of decommissioned Russian submarines, the destruction of Russian 
chemical weapons stocks, disposition of nuclear material and redirection of former 
weapons scientists constituted priority objectives for the Partnership. Yet, the 
activities of the Partners went well beyond these priority areas and included, for 
example, physical security upgrades, improvement of border security and detection 
                                                        
10 While Italy had originally pledged $ 1 billion, the country had spent only $ 140 million by 2010 (cf. 
Heyes/Bowen/Chalmers 2011, 31). The French contribution of $ 135 million by 2010 also fell short of 
fulfilling the original pledge of $ 750 million.  
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capabilities, and radiological11 and biosecurity12 related projects. As no report on the 
GP activities was published after the Chicago Summit,13 following information can be 
drawn from the 2011 report issued in Deauville to outline the major workload 
accomplished by the Partnership (G8 2011b):  
 
- 50% (20,000 tons)14 of the chemical weapons stocks of Russia were destroyed 
as of December 2010, which could only be achieved via the construction of 
respective destruction facilities;  
- 117 out of 120 decommissioned nuclear submarines in the Northwest region 
and 73 out of 78 in Russian Far East were dismantled; related work was 
expected to be completed in 2012;  
- facilities and infrastructure for the safe and secure storage of reactor 
compartments, radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel were constructed or 
refurbished;  
- 539 highly radioactive Radioisotopic Thermaelectric Generators (RTGs) used to 
power Russian lighthouses were “dismantled and replaced”; 
- support was provided to Ukraine in its efforts to deal with Chernobyl’s legacy, 
including the design and construction of a storage for highly radioactive 
sources; in addition, physical security upgrades at other facilities have been 
funded and equipment for radiation detection at the borders provided; 
- projects aiming at improving nuclear material accountancy and protection were 
funded in Russia; 
                                                        
11 Note that a G8 Action Plan on securing radioactive sources was adopted in Evian (France) in 2003.  
12 Bioterrorism was referred to in the G8 Action Plan on Non-Proliferation (G8 2004) adopted in 2004 as 
a “unique”, “grave” threat; the Plan committed the G8 to adopting related countermeasures.  
13 At Chicago, the debt crisis in Europe, the upheavals in Arab countries, and food security in Africa, and 
the situation in Afghanistan were dealt with while the GP seemingly did not constitute an agenda item. 
There is no reference made to the GP in the Camp David Declaration. Only a brief paragraph on the GP 
restating the commitment of the Partners to completing work in Russia, helping countries to fulfill 
pledges made at the two Nuclear Security Summits, and expanding membership along with a listing of 
the priorities of the initiative can be found in the “Annex to the G8 Foreign Ministers Meeting Chair’s 
Statement” (G8 2012).  
14 According to Paul F. Walker, this amount had grown to 24,000 tons by 2012 (cf. Stanley Foundation 
2012).  
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- 4,000 projects and “capacity building activities” have been funded at the 
International Science and Technology Centre (ISTC) in Moscow and at the 
Science and Technology Centre of Ukraine (STCU) in an effort to redirect former 
weapons scientists; 
- 3,000 “sustainable jobs” were created in Russian closed cities and institutes in 
countries such as Armenia and Ukraine. 
 
Apart from the work accomplished, the GP also generated a number of other benefits. 
The experience made and knowledge acquired during project implementation can, for 
instance, be utilized for future threat reduction work elsewhere. Heyes, Bowen and 
Chalmers (2011, 20) point out that Britain, for example, will be able to build on 
lessons-learned during dismantling Russian submarines once the country starts 
disassembling its own decommissioned submarines. More generally, both donors and 
recipients can draw from the networks formed among involved personnel and the 
managerial expertise generated (ibid., 67). The practice of piggy-backing, enabling 
countries to contribute to projects managed by other countries and thus making it 
easier for particularly small countries to participate in threat reduction work abroad, is 
certainly worth continuing (ibid., 75). This is all the more beneficial as piggy-backing 
simplifies the management of the entire enterprise for the recipient country, since it 
has to deal with a single country instead of a group of states.  
 
Nevertheless, all of these benefits and achievements aside, the GP has, of course, not 
been a perfect endeavor and also encountered a number of problems and 
shortcomings. Priority setting, programming and project implementation have not 
always been free of problems or friction. Progress in implementing Partnership goals 
and projects was, for instance, hampered in some cases by the failure of donors and 
Russia to reach agreement on issues such as liability protection, tax-free status, and 
access to relevant facilities (see Butler 2004). For example, according to Kobyakov and 
Orlov (2005, 8), because the US and Russia could not solve the issue of access to 
sensitive sites with nuclear material, in the first two years after 09/11, the amount of 
The G8 Global Partnership  WP 67 Hakan Akbulut  
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nuclear material at Russian sites receiving physical security upgrades decreased when 
compared to the pre-09/11 period. This was in conflict with the decision taken in the 
wake of the terrorist attacks to complete upgrades not by 2011, as initially foreseen, 
but by 2008. What is more, money earmarked for this very purpose was spent on 
other programs given the failure of the two parties to solve access issues. Kobyakov 
and Orlov (2005, 9) further hold that, apart from insufficient funding, unresolved 
questions related to liability protection were also responsible for the failure to 
implement the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement the US and Russia 
had signed back in 2000. The agreement envisaged the disposal of at least 34 metric 
tons of surplus weapons plutonium by each country, but did not include any provisions 
on liability. In the meantime, the 1998 US-Russian Technical Cooperation Agreement 
regulating liability expired in 2003. A protocol settling the liability issue was signed in 
2006 and signed into law only in 2011 after the two countries had succeeded in solving 
outstanding issues related to the disposition program in 2010 (cf. Horner 2011). The 
almost exclusive focus on Russia, the failure to admit a greater number of additional 
recipient countries and to modify priorities, mostly due to the opposition of Russia, 
constitute further points of criticism brought forward by observers. At this point, it is 
worth reminding that Russia has enjoyed a comfortable position to keep the GP on the 
course desired given the consensual decision-making within the GPWG (see for 
example Heyes/Bowen/Chalmers 2011, 7). The performance of the GPWG has also 
encountered some criticism. In the view of Heyes, Bowen and Chalmers (2011, 59), 
“the role of the group as a vehicle for monitoring progress, providing strategic 
guidance and undertaking detailed evaluations to ensure that lessons learned are 
widely disseminated across the GP community has been largely ineffective.” Add to 
this the fact that not all Partners have lived up to their financial pledges and that, at 
least in the initial period, not all the money earmarked for projects in Russia reached 
the country (cf. Kobyakov/Orlov 2005, 23). Necessary lessons will have to be drawn 
from these and other problems and failures encountered in the first phase of the GP 
for the period after 2012.  
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The Renewed Partnership  
The G8 tackled the question of extending the Partnership beyond 2012 in 2010 during 
its Muskoka Summit (Canada). Yet, no agreement was possible at that point, 
reportedly due to the opposition of the German government (cf. Crail 2011). Such 
opposition was, on the one hand, conditioned by financial concerns given the 
economic and debt crisis. On the other hand, the Germans were not convinced as to 
whether an effective use of funds could be guaranteed and monitored for future “new 
types of projects” (ibid.). Reluctance on the part of Germany caused a delay rather 
than a permanent deadlock and the decision to extend the Partnership was taken a 
year later when the G8 gathered in Deauville. However, in contrast to 2002, this time, 
the decision to continue cooperation was not matched with specific financial pledges 
of the G8 countries. Instead, the declaration simply held that decisions on funding 
would be taken by the participating countries “on a national, joint, or multilateral 
basis” (G8 2011a). Still, the US declared it was planning to provide another $ 10 billion 
for the next ten years “subject to annual Congressional appropriations” (US 
Department of State 2012). In a similar fashion, Canada pledged another $ 367 million 
for the period 2013-2018 (Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada 2012). It 
remains to be seen how much money will be earmarked by the other Partners for 
threat reduction programs. The GP website of Germany (Federal Foreign Office 2012), 
for example, only holds that “[f]rom 2012 onwards projects will be funded in line with 
their specific requirements and not on the basis of [ex ante] national pledges.” It is 
plausible to assume that the debt crisis will come to bear on the readiness of especially 
European countries to make large sums available for threat reduction programs.  
 
As for the areas of priority for the renewed Partnership, the 2010 Muskoka Summit 
defined nuclear and radiological security, biosecurity, scientist engagement, and the 
facilitation of the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 154015 as the 
                                                        
15 Resolution 1540 obliges states to create necessary legislation and the regulatory framework, to put in 
place effective border and export controls and guarantee the physical security of relevant material to 
prevent proliferation; especially proliferation to non-state actors. Moreover, states are asked to provide 
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main issues the Partners should focus on in the post-2012 period (G8 2011b). What 
exactly could be done in each field is outlined in the document titled “G8 Global 
Partnership Assessment and Options for Future Programming” issued at Deauville (G8 
2011b). In the field of nuclear and radiological security, a role for the GP is, for 
example, seen in helping countries to fulfill commitments made during the 2010 
Nuclear Security Summit. The report also lists specific tasks that could be fulfilled in 
Russia and Ukraine (“and other countries where applicable”) in confirmation of the 
understanding that FSU territory will continue to constitute one of the focal points for 
the renewed Partnership; e.g. continued spent fuel management, the lifting of sunken 
nuclear submarines and “hazardous radiological objects”, dismantlement of nuclear 
powered ships16 and decommissioning of weapons-grade plutonium production 
facilities. Scientist engagement – which may, for instance, take the form of awareness-
raising, sharing of best practices and providing support to civilian projects in an 
attempt to achieve an involvement of experts with relevant knowledge – is also to 
continue to appear highly on the GP-agenda in the post-2012 period. With regard to 
the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), the report goes on to hold that “[b]y 
providing equipment, expertise and training, GP partners could enhance WMD non-
proliferation and counter-terrorism capacities in countries seeking to meet 1540 
obligations and lacking the ability to do so, upon their request.” Even though not listed 
as one of the priorities for the renewed Partnership, given the fact that not all of 
existing stocks (especially in Russia) have been destroyed and not all countries have 
acceded to the CWC yet, the Partners declare their readiness to address eventual 
related challenges in the future, too. In line with this, the list of priorities is not of an 
exclusionary nature and it is explicitly stated that “other priorities may be added as 
appropriate.”  
 
The questions regarding the amount of funding that will be available for future 
programming, the type of projects to be implemented and the countries or regions                                                                                                                                                                   
assistance to those countries lacking the resources and capabilities to meet these obligations on their 
own.   
16 Kobyokov and Orlov (2005, 7) referred in 2005 to 41 ships awaiting dismantlement. 
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where such funds will be spent, are undoubtedly closely tied to the issue of the future 
composition of the Partnership in terms of membership. The Partners and the GPWG 
have been reaching out to potential new members and exploring the possibility of 
bringing in countries such as China, India, Argentina, Brazil or South Africa. Turkey as a 
rising power at the crossroads between the Middle East, Central Asia and Europe is 
seen as another potential candidate (see also Stanley Foundation 2012). Overall, 
extending the membership in a manner that creates a greater geographic balance and 
brings in countries that might add to the resources of the GP, in terms of financing, 
political weight, and technical and managerial capacities will constitute a major 
undertaking in the years ahead. An expanded Partnership will undoubtedly render it 
easier for the initiative to live up to its claim to operate beyond any frontiers and 
respond to threats wherever they emerge. 
 
At the same time, eventual geographical expansion and the inclusion of potential 
political heavy weights from different parts of the world will bring structural questions 
to the forefront. So far, the non-G8 GP member-states seem to have reconciled 
themselves to some sort of a second-class membership. According to Bonnie D. 
Jenkins, US State Department’s Coordinator for Threat Reduction Programs and the 
Chairperson of the GPWG in 2012, prior to her assuming the chair, non-G8 partners did 
not even attend all meetings of the group and acted “more like observers than 
participants” (see Stanley Foundation 2012). By her own account, under her 
chairmanship, these countries have been invited to all meetings, which helped to 
render the process more “collaborative and interactive” (ibid.). In line with this, Heyes, 
Bowen and Chalmers (2011, 60) maintain that “there appears to have been little real 
opportunity for non-G8 GP countries to influence priorities, despite the significant 
sums of money and expertise that some have committed to projects.” It is unlikely that 
countries like China, India, or Brazil would be content with a second-class membership. 
Thus, expansion will most likely intensify debates about the question as to whether the 
GP should be taken out of the G8 format (see Stanley Foundation 2012). For Jenkins, 
this is something that will have to be addressed in the future and could indeed 
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materialize (ibid.). The same position is shared by Sabine Nölke, the Director General 
of the GP Program at Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, who pointing to 
the current practice of having the GPWG chair rotate with the G8 presidency, views 
this as an issue to be addressed should countries such as India or China join the 
Partnership (ibid.). 
 
Overall, from today’s perspective, there seems to exist an intended level of vagueness 
or nebulosity. While the areas of priority have been defined, it has been done in a 
manner leaving almost any threat reduction effort eligible for GP accounting. It is 
especially difficult to think of any CBRN material or technology related activity that 
cannot be subsumed under the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 – facilitating the 
implementation thereof was listed at Muskoka as one of the major tasks for the 
renewed Partnership. In addition, the post-2012 GP is anticipated to operate 
worldwide and not to almost exclusively focus on a specific region or country. What is 
more, the question as to what amount will be committed to fulfill this overwhelming 
mission remains to be answered; only a few countries have so far pledged specific 
sums. This vagueness can be expected to translate into a great level of flexibility and 
allow the GP to fit into many dresses in terms of programming, membership, and the 
area of operation. Indeed, the mission statement formulated in the abovementioned 
document “G8 Global Partnership Assessment and Options for Future Programming” 
(G8 2011b) attests to this notion of a catch-all approach or coverage: 
 
After 2012, the GP should evolve towards, on the one hand, a 
mechanism for the identification and analysis of third countries' 
assistance needs, upon their request, in their endeavours against WMD 
proliferation and, on the other hand, a group for the assessment of the 
capabilities and skills its various members are able to contribute, either 
individually or collectively delivery of this assistance [sic!]. These efforts 
should be done in coordination with existing multilateral mechanisms, 
including the 1540 Committee. 
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In the light of these parameters, one can expect the renewed Partnership to constitute 
a loose coalition of the willing to promote threat reduction. It could be a hybrid, on the 
one side, bringing in and building on the experiences, lessons-learned, expertise, 
networks, and principles of the old-GP, and, at the same time, extended and 
supplemented with elements drawn from the nuclear security summit (NSS) series 
anticipated to come to an end in 2014. The distinguishing feature of both formats has 
been the concrete work done in the field. Rather than creating an institutionalized 
paper tiger, keeping up this momentum and getting work done within a loosely 
organized, flexible, collaborative network of states coordinating and reporting their 
threat reduction activities and achievements would constitute a much more favorable 
outcome. The renewed GP might grow to the size of the NSS (yet, leaving the door 
open to additional participants) and cover a vast variety of threat reduction activities, 
including not only those implemented abroad, but also measures adopted at home. So 
far, projects reported to the GP included only those implemented in other countries – 
the only and major exception to this has been Russian funding of projects within the 
country. In contrast, within the NSS format, countries’ “house gifts” or “gift baskets” – 
pledges made by single states or groupings of states on relevant work to be done 
within a specified period of time – in most cases also included threat reduction work at 
home. Moreover, such work sometimes consisted of removing HEU or spent fuel. In 
other cases, countries announced they would adopt new legislation, sign up to 
international treaties, or host relevant conferences. In short, a very broad portfolio of 
activities and measures has been treated as eligible for NSS “accounting”. Transferring 
such practice to the GP seems to be both favorable and warranted as this would 
doubtlessly add to its “flexibility” and “inclusivity”. If the assumption that any security 
gap anywhere poses a threat to the security of all is meant to guide threat reduction 
work, there seems to be no reason to squeeze the GP into a tightly tailored set of 
responsibilities and geographical scope.  
 
Indeed, the participants of the 2010 NSS were identified by Bonnie D. Jenkins (2010) as 
potential new members for the GP (see also Crail 2011). Moreover, Jenkins offered the 
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view that “[t]he GP should include any project funded to ensure chemical, biological, 
radiological, or nuclear weapons or materials do not land in the hands of proliferators, 
nonstate [sic!] actors, and terrorists regardless of where they operate.” Such an 
approach would obviously allow for almost any kind of threat reduction work carried 
out anywhere to be attributed to the GP. In fact, Heyes, Bowen and Chalmers (2011, 
73) argue that the reason for the Obama administration to organize the NSS in 2010, a 
few month before the G8 summit, was to take place in Muskoka was “at least in part, 
to add momentum to the process of refocusing GP efforts away from Russia and 
towards the goal of securing fissile material on a global basis.” In yet another article 
published in 2010, Heyes and Bowen (2010, 22) assert that if the nuclear and 
radiological security had been tackled “in tandem with the start of the GP’s work in 
2002, the urgency for the Obama initiative might not have existed.” A reconfigured GP 
that is truly global in terms of geographic outreach and mission portfolio could thus be 
expected to make up for the termination of the NSS series.  
 
As a collaborative network of like-minded states willing to promote threat reduction, 
there would not be any necessity for the GP to be organized hierarchically or to uphold 
a two-tier structure divided between the G8 states and the non-G8 states. This would 
not foreclose the possibility for the G8 states and other big players with greater 
resources at hand to act as “primus inter pares” and take responsibility for bigger 
projects or contribute more extensively. The Working Group could (in line with given 
practice) function like a clearing house that collects and disseminates information 
about given needs and available capabilities. In addition, the GPWG could continue to 
“watch” over the program and help to prevent overlaps and potential duplication. 
Overall, the Group would fulfill management responsibilities within a horizontally 
organized network. Obtaining very specific pledges with regard to the nature of the 
contribution and the time horizon within which such commitments were to be 
realized, ensuring a reporting to the GPWG on the progress made and the 
consolidation and sharing of such information by the Group, would constitute core 
elements for the functioning of such a system. Guaranteeing that the contributions of 
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states are made visible could provide a major incentive for states to join the 
collaborative undertaking, raising their international profile.17 It would also allow for 
public naming and shaming in cases where states do not live up to their commitments. 
In order to ensure that the attention given to the topic by the higher echelons of 
power, which is in turn said to render securing necessary funds much easier, is 
sustained, one could also think about holding GPWG meetings at the level of ministers 
or heads of states in greater intervals (a cycle of five years similar to the NPT review 
mechanism could be an option) on the sidelines of preferably G20 summits or of the 
opening sessions of the UN General Assembly (to keep the costs of such meetings 
down).   
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the details of such a collaborative effort would have to 
be clarified, what has been described above could constitute its general outline. It is 
obvious that such a structure should also encompass relevant international 
organizations (IAEA, OPCW,…) and NGOs18 – in line with current practice. The expertise 
they bring in should help to keep money consuming institutionalization at a minimum 
level, identify both needs and resources, and generate synergies. It is worth reminding 
that on many occasions GP members have worked through the IAEA, for instance, and 
committed money to the Agency’s Nuclear Security Fund in order to support work on 
nuclear and radiological security (cf. Heyes/Bowen/Chalmers 2011, 73).  
 
Overall, the tasks fulfilled in the future are likely to be of a different nature than the 
work accomplished in Russia. Prevention work rather than CBRN related fire-fighting is 
likely to dominate the agenda and take the GP to regions such as Southeast Asia and 
the Middle East, where a number of countries have devised plans to utilize nuclear 
energy. However, some first-generation work will have to be carried out in the FSU – 
for example, as mentioned above, in the form of the dismantlement of nuclear                                                         
17 Kobyakov and Orlov (2005, 3) argue that “small-scale” contributions by some countries to the GP 
were motivated by an expectation that this would, among other things, raise the country’s international 
profile and have a positive public relations effect. 
18 According to information provided by Bonnie D. Jenkins, the GPWG met with NGO representatives 
before each session of the Group in 2012 to discuss relevant issues (Stanley Foundation 2012).  
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powered ships; yet, Russia will most likely be expected to carry the burden mainly 
itself given the inflow of energy Rubles (including those in the nuclear field) and arms 
sales earnings.19 Moreover, first-generation projects could again appear high on the 
agenda should the strategic context change and countries with CW stocks accede to 
the CWC (see also Stanley Foundation 2012),20 states decide to drastically reduce 
existing fissile material stocks, or the US/NATO and Russia agree on an elimination of 
all tactical nuclear weapons. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper set out to outline the evolution and functioning of the GP, summarized its 
main achievements, and tackled the question as to how its future might look like. 
Spending approximately $ 21 billion in a joint effort on threat reduction, mainly in 
Russia, is an impressive achievement. As shown above, a great deal has been done to 
cope with the WMD legacy of the former Soviet Union. However, it is important to 
note that threat reduction work can never be conclusive and has to be carried on. 
Thus, sustaining this momentum, ensuring necessary commitment on the part of old 
and potential new partners, and continuing work in the years ahead is the challenge. 
Nevertheless, this needs to be done in close consideration of and co-ordination with 
other necessities and requirements. Even though the threat posed by WMD is global 
and there seems to exist agreement that the consequences of related incidents would 
be painful, it would be illusive to assume that every country viewed threat reduction as 
a pressing issue that should be prioritized over other needs. This is even less the case 
in times of financial and debt crises, which will most likely come to bear on the 
readiness of European G8 members to commit extensive funds to the GP as well. As a 
consequence, rather than expecting such countries to adapt their spending to GP                                                         
19 According to Bowen and Heyes (2010, 17-19), the GP could have done more to communicate its 
achievements to the public. From their point of view, the (almost) exclusive focus on Russia was one 
major reason making GP members “downplay their financial contributions to the partnership”. Given 
the fact that Russia has been making a lot of money with energy exports and reclaiming its great power 
status, the public would probably have shown little understanding for the expenditures on CTR in this 
country, so Heyes and Bowen (ibid.). 
20 Among others, countries such as Israel, Syria and North Korea have still not fully acceded to the 
Treaty.  
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priorities, it would be more promising to adapt the GP to the existing budgetary 
realities. Indeed, as shown above, the GP seems to have been reconfigured in a 
manner guaranteeing the highest level of flexibility in terms of priorities, future 
membership and funding. So, the renewed Partnership will most likely be one bringing 
together a vast variety of countries performing a vast variety of work in a vast variety 
of regions and states in accordance with their own technical and financial capacities. 
The unknowns from today’s perspective are the lifespan of this coalition of the willing 
and the extent of resources it will commit to threat reduction work – both remain to 
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